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CASE NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-ILLINOIS COURT ALLOWS
ACTION FOR PROPERTY TAXES ASSESSED
IN FOREIGN STATE
The City of Detroit, Michigan, and its treasurer brought an action in
the Circuit Court of Cook County against a resident of Illinois to recover
1954 and 1955 personal property taxes assessed against property located in
Detroit and owned by the defendant, who resided in Detroit during those
years. That court sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss on the
ground that Illinois courts will not enforce the revenue laws of another
state or country, a principle long adhered to in the field of conflict of
laws.' On a direct appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois held for the first
time that as a matter of comity Illinois courts will enforce the taxing
statutes of Michigan, and therefore reversed and remanded for 'further
proceedings. Having decided the issue on the basis of comity,2 the court
declined to determine the constitutional question of whether Illinois
courts must give full faith and credit to the taxing statutes of Michigan.
City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 111. 2d 297, 146 N.E. 2d 61 (1957).
Thus the State of Illinois joins three other states3 which have recently
rejected the generally accepted doctrine that no state will enforce the
revenue laws of another state. As indicated by the court in the instant case
the rule originated in dicta announced in cases presenting the issue of
whether an otherwise valid commercial contract which did not comply
with the revenue laws of the situs was enforceable in the courts of the
1 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (C.A. 2d, 1929), aff'd on other grounds 281 U.S. 18
(1929); Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); City of Detroit v.
Proctor, 5 Terry (Del. Super. Ct.) 193, 61 A.2d 412 (1948); In re Martin's Estate, 136
Misc. 51, 240 N.Y.S. 393 (1930); In re Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 51, 202 N.Y.S. 185 (1923);
State v. Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N. Y. S. 173 (1911); Queen of Holland v. Drukker
[1928] 1 Ch. 877; Sydney v. Bull [1908] 1 K.B. 7; Beale, Conflict of Laws S 610.2 (1935) ;
Rest., Conflict of Laws §610, Comment c (1934). For a general discussion of the prob-
lem see Daum, Interstate Comity and Governmental Claims, 33 111. L. Rev. 249 (1938);
Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1932); Action for Tax Due in Another State, 165 A.L.R. 796 (1946); Comment,
28 Calif. L. Rev. 507 (1940).
2 Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U.S. 268, 272 (1935). "A state court, in conformity
to state policy, may, by comity, give a remedy which the full faith and credit clause
does not compel."
a1 Arkansas: State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282
S.WV.2d 150 (1955); Kentucky: Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d
722 (1950); Missouri: State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App.
1115, 193 S.WV.2d 919 (1946).
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forum.4 In none of these cases was there an attempt made to recover
taxes in the courts of another state or country. The first time an American
court was squarely confronted with the issue was in the case of Maryland
v. Turner,5 where the State of Maryland and the City of Baltimore sued
in New York to recover taxes assessed by Maryland and Baltimore upon
the personal property of the defendant while he was a resident of that
state and city. Plaintiffs claimed that the obligation to pay a duly assessed
tax was contractual, and therefore that the action was in the nature of
common law action for debt. The New York Supreme Court denied the
claim, specifically holding that taxes are forced contributions, obligations
imposed upon citizens to pay the expenses of government, and consequent-
ly do not rest upon either express or implied contract. The reasoning of the
court was that since tax laws are penal in nature, and since no state en-
forces the penal laws of another,6 no state should enforce the taxing
statutes of another. Similar reasoning was employed in Moore v. Mitchell7
and State of Colorado v. Harbeck,8 considered to be leading authorities
supporting the proposition. However, it is important to note that neither
of these holdings was directly in point, for in each case the suit was by a
state or state official to collect an inheritance tax on intangible personal
estate of a former deceased resident. Neither the property nor the person
was present within the state at the time the tax was levied. Thus the taxing
state was held to have no jurisdiction to constitutionally levy the tax. It is
obvious that the facts of the instant case are materially different because
here both the defendant and his personal property were in Detroit when
the taxes were assessed.
The United States Supreme Court has never expressly determined the
problem. However, in Milwaukee County v. White9 it was clearly estab-
lished that the forum must give full faith and credit to the tax judgments
of sister states. Faced with its own holding in State of Wisconsin v. Peli-
can Insurance Co.10 the Supreme Court said:
4 Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns (N.Y.) 94 (1806) (failure to affix stamps on
promissory note); James v. Catherwood, 3 Dow. & Ry. 190 (1823) (failure to use
stamps on receipt for a loan); Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (1779)(evasion of foreign duties); Boucher v. Lawson, Cas.t.H. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (1734)(law of Portugal prohibiting export of gold).
5 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y.S. 173 (1911).
6 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. of New
Orleans, 127 U.S. 265 (1888); The Antelope, 10 Wheat. (U.S.) 66 (1825).
7 30 F.2d 600 (C.A. 2d, 1929), aff'd on other grounds 281 U.S. 18 (1929).
8 232 N.Y. 71,133 N.E. 357 (1921). 9 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
10 127 U.S. 265 (1887) wherein Wisconsin brought an action of debt in the forum on
a penal judgment obtained against a Louisiana corporation in a Wisconsin court. The
Supreme Court held that one state need not give full faith and credit to the penal judg-
ments of sister states.
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Even if the judgment is deemed to be colored by the nature of the obligation
whose validity it establishes and we are free to reexamine it and, if we find it to
be based on an obligation penal in character, to refuse to enforce it outside the
state where rendered . . . still the obligation to pay taxes is not penal. It is a
statutory liability, quasi-contractual in nature, enforcible, if there is no exclu-
sive statutory remedy, in the civil courts by the common law action of debt or
indebitatus assumpsit.11
This language was directly responsible for the overthrow of the general
rule. Eleven years later State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodg-
ers 2 expressly repudiated the doctrine that one state will not be a tax
collector for another. Pursuant to Oklahoma statutes authorizing the
Commission to sue to collect taxes in another state, Oklahoma had sued in
Missouri to recover income taxes assessed against the defendant while he
was a resident of that state. After an exhaustive analysis of the cases sup-
porting the older doctrine, the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that
a tax obligation is in the nature of a debt and is not a penalty. In the lan-
guage of the court:
Revenue laws are similar to penal laws only in the sense that they are both
state regulations of a civic duty, but intrinsically they are different. A penal law
is punitive in nature, while a revenue law defines the extent of the citizen's pe-
cuniary obligation to the state, and provides a remedy for its collection. 13
The Gould case directly incorporates the rationale of the Rodgers case.
Michigan Statutes and the Municipal Code of the City of Detroit provide
that as soon as assessed, personal property taxes become a debt against the
owner.14 Furthermore, a municipal corporation by its appropriate officers
is empowered to sue in courts of other states to collect taxes legally due to
Michigan or its political subdivisions. 5 Since the purpose of a tax law is
not to punish, the action is in the nature of a debt for money due in the
Circuit Court of Cook County. A taxpayer who enjoys the protection of
a state government should bear his share of the expense of maintaining
that government. The defendant enjoyed the protection of Michigan law
11 Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U.S. 268, 271 (1935).
12238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). This is the first American case that
unequivocally challenges the reasoning of the older rule. Most cases antedating the
Rodgers case have permitted enforcement of tax claims of a sister state without directly
attacking the rule. Standard Embossing Plate Mfg. Co. v. American Salpa Corp., 113
N.J.Eq. 468, 167 Atl. 755 (1933) (claim for franchise taxes filed by Delaware in New
Jersey bankruptcy proceedings allowed as preferred claims). Accord: Holshouser Co.
v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650 (1905).
13 State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d
919, 926 (1946). For an illuminating analysis of the distinction between penal and
revenue laws refer to comment in 47 Mich. L. Rev. 796 (1949); note in 41 Il. L. Rev.
439 (1946).
14Mich. Stat. Ann. (1948) §7.81; Municipal Code of the City of Detroit c. 81, §1,
c. 67, §3.
15 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1948) §27.605.
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while he was present there. Therefore, there is no reason why he should
be allowed to escape his obligation by crossing the state line. In substance
then, the Illinois Supreme Court holds that a tax is not a penalty because
its purpose and effect is not to punish a person for committing a wrong
against the state. Instead it is an implied obligation which everyone present
within the jurisdiction owes in return for the indirect benefit he enjoys
from the protection afforded by state law. In other words it is a statutory
liability quasi-contractual in nature. Consequently, it may be collected by
the state, just as by a private individual, through a civil action at law.
The theory generally urged for non-enforcement is that only the sover-
eign against whom a wrong is committed may punish the wrongdoer. In
criminal law this is what is called the theory of retributive justice. But if
an individual is deemed to be taxed not because he has in some way
offended the public justice, but rather as an incident to enjoying the
benefit of state law, then the theory of retributive justice no longer re-
mains a bar. Furthermore, in criminal law the device of extradition is often
used to return a fugitive to the state where the crime was committed.
However, it has never been employed to return a tax evader to the taxing
jurisdiction, no matter how wilful and dishonest the evasion, or how
great the amount involved. Indirectly this seems to furnish additional sup-
port to the holding in the instant case.'
At any rate while it may be true that a tax imposed by a state is not ex-
pressly consented to by its resident, this does not necessarily create a penal
liability within the definition laid down by the United States Supreme
Court and generally accepted by the courts of this country:
The question whether a statute of one state, which in some aspects may be
called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that it cannot be en-
forced in the courts of another state, depends upon the question whether its pur-
pose is to punish an offense against the-public justice of the state, or to afford a
private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.17
Assuming that revenue laws are not penal, if a suit is brought by a
state or local tax collector, it nevertheless might be maintained that such
an officer, like an executor or administrator, has no power to sue outside
his own jurisdiction.' 8 However, where suit is brought by the state itself
16 One writer avoids making a distinction between penal and revenue laws, and in-
stead asserts that a tax obligation is somewhere in the area between ordinary transitory
actions by private citizens to collect a debt, and the process of extradition. He suggests
that an action by a state to collect a tax obligation be considered as transitory. Leflar,
Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 219
(1932).
17 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892). Accord: Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99,120 N.E. 198 (1918).
18 Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1929).
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or in the name of the state pursuant to statutes authorizing such action,
and where the tax has been assessed while the defendant and his property
are within the jurisdiction, it would appear that the contention loses much
of its vitality.
But since the forum is not required to give full faith and credit to the
revenue laws of a sister state, there are a number of valid objections it
might consider. For the principle of comity is basically a practical one.
Thus the forum might decline to enforce because of difficulty in inter-
preting foreign tax law. Or else it might refuse to extend courtesy because
collecting such taxes overburdens the pocketbooks of local taxpayers or
overcrowds the dockets of the courts. In an appropriate situation the
forum could even reject on the ground of local public policy.19 In fact it
has been suggested that if the sister state could have reasonably collected
the tax within its borders, the forum can apply the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. 20
According to City of Detroit v. Gould, and the two other cases which
have arisen since the Rodgers case, enforcement of taxing statutes of sister
states has no detrimental commercial effect. Nor is there any reason of
policy why comity should not be extended to them. However, it is impor-
tant to remember that in each of these cases 1) the taxing state treated the
tax as a debt due and owing to the state or municipality from the moment
of assessment; 2) statutes authorized the state or city to bring a civil ac-
tion in the nature of debt; 3) statutes of the taxing state provided no ex-
clusive remedy for the collection of taxes; 4) both the defendant and his
property were physically present within the state at the time the taxes
were assessed; 5) the action was to collect a tax, and not a penalty for
failure to pay on time. For where the statutes of the taxing state provide
an exclusive local remedy for the recovery of a tax, the forum will refuse
to enforce the tax (even though it considers revenue laws not to be
penal) on the ground that the right and the remedy are so interwoven as
to allow recovery only in the taxing state. 21
Therefore the decisions arising since the Rodgers case definitely seem
to indicate that there is no absolute bar to extraterritorial enforcement of
revenue laws of sister states. City of Detroit v. Proctor22 provides the sole
exception. There, in a factual situation identical with that in the Gould
19 Wayne County v. American Steel Export Co., 272 App. Div. 585, 101 N.Y.S.2d
522 (1950); Wayne County v. Foster and Reynolds Co., 277 App. Div. 1105, 101
N.Y.S.2d 526 (1950).
20 Leflar, op. cit. supra note 16, at 218; note, 41 111. L. Rev. 439, 442 (1946).
21 California ex rel. Houser v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App.,
1953) (inheritance tax).
22 5 Terry (Del. Super. Ct.) 193, 61 A.2d 412 (1948).
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case, the Superior Court of Delaware after admitting that the older rule
originally evolved as dictum, nevertheless rejected the reasoning of the
Rodgers case, and refused to enforce the tax law. Apparently the Dela-
ware court felt that such a change must come from the legislature. On the
other hand the Supreme Court of Arkansas believes that the so called
modern trend of allowing enforcement as a matter of comity is now the
majority view.23 The American Law Institute lends its weight to this
belief in its 1948 Supplement to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
Whereas the 1934 edition read, "No action can be maintained by a for-
eign state to enforce its license or revenue laws, or claims for taxes, '2 4 the
1948 Supplement provides, "The Institute expresses no opinion whether
an action can be maintained by a foreign state on a claim for taxes. '25
When it is considered that practically all the American cases favoring the
doctrine of non-enforcement of foreign revenue laws have arisen in the
State of New York, while those supporting the modern doctrine have
arisen in four separate jurisdictions, it is evident that the Arkansas court
might be correct.
23 State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d 150,
152 (1955).
24 Rest., Conflict of Laws §610 c (1934).
25 Rest., Conflict of Laws §610 c (Supp., 1948).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ORDINANCE REQUIRING
PERMIT TO SOLICIT MEMBERSHIP FOR A UNION
INVALID AS PRIOR RESTRAINT
Defendant, a salaried employee of the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, was attempting to organize the employees of a manu-
facturing company located in the town of Hazelhurst, Georgia. Many of
these employees lived in Baxley, a nearby city. An ordinance of the City
of Baxley provided that no one could lawfully solicit membership for any
union or other organization requiring membership fees before first secur-
ing a permit from the Mayor and City Council. This permit could be
granted or denied on the basis of the character of the applicant, the nature
of the organization, and its effects upon the "general welfare" of the citi-
zens.1 Defendant went to Baxley and, without applying for a permit as
1 The Baxley ordinance is set out in the instant case at 78 S. Ct. 277, 278 (1958). "Sec-
tion I. Before any person or persons, firms or organizations shall solicit membership for
any organization, union or society of any sort which requires from its members the
payment of membership fees, dues or is entitled to make assessment against its members,
such person or persons shall make application in writing to Mayor and Council of the
City of Baxley for the issuance of a permit to solicit members in such organization
from among the citizens of Baxley .... Section IV. In passing upon such application
the Mayor and Council shall consider the character of the applicant, the nature of the
business of the organization for which members are desired to be solicited, and its
effects upon the general welfare of citizens of the City of Baxley...."
